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Abstract
We present a proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings that provides
effective proxy revocation. The scheme uses a binding-blinding technique
to avoid secure channel requirements in the key issuance stage. With this
technique, the signer receives a partial private key from a trusted authority
and unblinds it to get his private key, in turn, overcomes the key escrow
problem which is a constraint in most of the pairing-based proxy signature
schemes. The scheme fulfills the necessary security requirements of proxy
signature and resists other possible threats.
Keywords: proxy signature, proxy revocation, bilinear pairings, key escrow.
1 Introduction
Proxy signature is a digital signature where an original signer delegates his signing
capability to a proxy signer, and then the proxy signer performs message signing
on behalf of the original signer. The notion of proxy signature has been evolved
over a long time, 16 years now [1]. However, the cryptographic treatment on proxy
signature was introduced by Mambo et al [2] in 1996. They classified the delegation
capability in three types, namely full delegation, partial delegation and delegation
∗Corresponding author.
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by warrant. In full delegation, an original signer directly gives his private key to
a proxy signer and using it the proxy signer signs the document. The drawback
of proxy signature with full delegation is that the absence of a distinguishability
between the original signer and the proxy signer. In partial delegation, the original
signer derives a proxy key from his private key and hands it over to the proxy
signer as a delegation of signing rights. In this case, the proxy signer can misuse
the delegation of signing rights, because partial delegation does not restrict the
proxy signer’s signing capability. The weakness of full and partial delegations are
eliminated by partial delegation with warrant, where a warrant explicitly states the
signers’ identity, delegation period and the qualification of the message on which
the proxy signer can sign, etc. Once proxy delegation is given, the revocation is
an important issue in the proxy signature scheme. For instance, the original signer
key is compromised or any misuse of delegation of signing rights is noticed. It may
so happen that the original signer wants to terminate his delegation power before
the expiry e.g., the manager of a company has come back from his trip before time
that he was scheduled for.
Desirable security properties of proxy signatures have evolved over this period and
a widely accepted list of required properties are as follows:
- Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy
signature on behalf of the original signer. But the original signer and other
third parties cannot create a valid proxy signature.
- Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the correspond-
ing proxy signer from the proxy signature.
- Verifiability: The verifier can be convinced of the original signer’s agreement
from the proxy signature.
- Distinguishability: Proxy signatures are distinguishable from normal signa-
tures by everyone.
- Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature, he
cannot deny the signature creation.
- Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for other
purposes than it is made for. That is, he cannot sign message with the proxy
key that have not been defined in the warrant. If he does so, he will be
identified explicitly from the warrant.
After Mambo et al.’s [2] scheme, several schemes have been proposed [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7]. However, most of the schemes lack proxy revocation mechanism. Recently,
the bilinear pairings, namely the Weil pairing and the Tate pairing of algebraic
curves have been found important applications [8], [9], [10] in identity(ID) based
cryptography. The advantage of an ID-based cryptography [11] is that it avoids
public key certification, the public key of a user is his identity, e.g., e-mail, social
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security number, etc. There are a few proxy signature schemes [12], [13], [14], [15]
based on bilinear pairings; however, the schemes lack the key escrow problem and
have not addressed the proxy revocation mechanism. In this paper, we present a
proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings that provides effective proxy revo-
cation mechanism. Our scheme is not exactly ID-based, it is a variant of ID-based
schemes. The scheme does not require secure channel in the key issuance stage
and avoids the key escrow problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some preliminar-
ies. Section 3 presents the scheme. Section 4 analyzes the security and performance
of the scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Suppose G1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, generated by P , and G2
is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is
called a bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following properties:
- Bilinear: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q ;
- Non-degenerate: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1 ;
- Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) ∀ P,Q ∈ G1.
In general, G1 is a group of points on an elliptic curve and G2 is a multiplicative
subgroup of a finite field.
2.2 Computational Problems
Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) : Given Q,R ∈ G1, find an
integer a ∈ Z∗q such that R = aQ.
Definition 2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP, cP )
for a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , determine whether c ≡ ab mod q. The advantage Adv of any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving DDHP in G1 is defined as:
AdvDDHA,G1 =
[
Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP ) = 1]− Pr[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1] : a, b, c ∈ Z∗q
]
.
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, AdvDDHA,G1 is negligible.
Definition 3. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP )
for a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abP .
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving CDHP
in G1 is defined as:
AdvCDHA,G1 =
[
Pr[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1 : a, b ∈ Z∗q
]
.
For every probabilistic algorithm A, AdvCDHA,G1 is negligible.
Definition 4. Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDHP): A class of problems where
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DDHP is easy while CDHP is hard.
Definition 5. Weak Diffie-Hellman Problem (WDHP) : Given (P,Q, aP ) for a ∈ Z∗q ,
compute aQ.
3 The Proposed Scheme
To avoid the original signer’s forgery and prevention of delegation power misuse,
the proxy-protected proxy signature [3] is a secure approach. Our scheme is based
on proxy-protected notion and uses the merits of partial delegation with warrant1.
The participating entities and their roles in the proposed scheme are defined as
follows:
• Private Key Generator (PKG): A trusted authority who receives signer’s
identity (ID) along with other parameters, checks validity of ID and issues
partial private key to the signer corresponding to the ID.
• Original Signer: Entity who delegates his signing rights to a proxy signer.
• Proxy Signer: Entity who signs the message on behalf of the original signer.
• Verifier: Entity who verifies the proxy signature and decides to accept or
reject.
The scheme has five phases: Setup, KeyGen, ProxyKeyGen, ProxySignGen and
ProxySignVerify. The phases work as follows.
[ Setup ]
It takes as input a security parameter; and outputs system parameters params and
master-key of PKG. The params includes a cyclic additive group G1 of prime order
q generated by P , a cyclic multiplicative group G2 of prime order q, a bilinear map
eˆ : G1×G1 → G2, hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗×G1×G1 → G1, H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1,
h : {0, 1}∗×G1×G1 → Z
∗
q , and public key of PKG. The PKG selects a master-key
s ∈ Z∗q and computes public key as PubPKG = sP . The PKG publishes params =
(G1, G2, eˆ, q, P, PubPKG, H1, H2, h) and keeps s secret.
[ KeyGen ]
It takes user chosen parameters and params as inputs; and outputs user private
key. The entire phase consists of a partial private key issuance and a private key
generation stages. The stages use a binding-blinding technique to avoid the key
escrow problem and to eliminate the secure channel requirements. The binding-
blinding technique works as follows:
- The user chooses two secret binding factors, calculates the binding param-
eters and sends them to the PKG over a public channel along with his/her
identity.
1A warrant consists of original signer and proxy signer identities, qualification of the message
on which the proxy signer can sign, validity period of the delegation, etc.
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- As the communication channel between the user and the PKG is a public
channel, a dishonest party can construct his/her preferred binding parameters
using the targeted user’s identity and sends the binding parameters along
with user’s identity before the user submits a request for partial private key.
To avoid this type of attack, the PKG first sends a message to the email-id2
(email-id acts as the user identity) and asks a confirmation from the email-id
owner. If the email-id owner confirms his/her request for a partial private
key, then the PKG proceeds to the next step.
- The PKG checks the validity of binding parameters. Upon successful valida-
tion of the parameters, the PKG computes signer partial private key. Then,
the PKG sends the partial private key to the user in a blinding manner over
the public channel.
PartialPrivateKey issuance:
- User Uλ computes his own public key Pubλ = H2(IDλ).
- Uλ picks two secret binding factors aλ, bλ ∈ Z
∗
q and computes Xλ = aλPubλ,
Yλ = aλbλPubλ, Zλ = bλP and Wλ = aλbλP . Then he sends (Xλ, Yλ, Zλ,
Wλ, IDλ) to the PKG over a public channel.
- Once the IDλ is correct (we assume that identity of the user is his/her email-
id and unregistered identity attack can be avoided by the above mentioned
email confirmation procedure), the PKG computes Pubλ = H2(IDλ) and
verifies the validity of IDλ by whether eˆ(Yλ, P ) = eˆ(Xλ, Zλ) = eˆ(Pubλ,Wλ).
- The PKG computes Uλ’s partial private key as Dλ = sYλ and creates a
registration-token Regλ = sZλ corresponding to IDλ. Then, PKG publishes
(Regλ, IDλ) in a public directory and sends Dλ to Uλ over a public channel.
We note that the PKG controls the public directory and checks every request before
issuance of any partial private key. If the identity is present in the directory, the
PKG denies the request, thereby the registration-token replacement is not possible
by any other party.
PrivateKey generation:
- On receiving the partial private key Dλ, the signer Uλ checks its correctness
by whether eˆ(Dλ, P ) = eˆ(Yλ, PubPKG). If Dλ is valid, Uλ unblinds it and
generates his private key as Sλ = a
−1
λ Dλ.
2At this juncture, we assume that the email-id acts as the user identity; however, other identity
could play the same role if it avoids the unregistered identity attack. We note that it is a difficult
task to avoid the unregistered identity attack for any types of identity if there is no off-line (secure
channel) interaction between the PKG and the user, in turn it opens a prominent future scope
of our proposed work.
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Original signer private key: Let IDo be the identity of an original signer. The orig-
inal signer chooses binding secret factors ao and bo and runs the KeyGen algorithm
to get his partial private key as
Do ← PartialPrivateKey(Xo, Yo, Zo,Wo, IDo).
After validating Do, the original signer generates his private key as So = a
−1
o Do.
Proxy signer private key: Let IDp be the identity of the proxy signer. The proxy
signer chooses the binding factors ap and bp and runs the KeyGen algorithm to get
his partial private key as
Dp ← PartialPrivateKey(Xp , Yp, Zp,Wp, IDp).
After validating Dp, the proxy signer generates his private key as Sp = a
−1
p Dp.
[ ProxyKeyGen]
- The original signer and proxy signer agree on a warrant mw.
- The original signer computes Uo = So+boH1(mw, Pubo, Pubp), ψo = boP and
sends the tuple (mw, Uo, ψo, Pubo) to the proxy signer over a public channel
as the delegation capability.
- The proxy signer checks whether
eˆ(Uo, P ) = eˆ(ψo, H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))eˆ(Pubo, Rego).
- If the delegation capability is valid, the proxy signer computes proxy key as
Vp = Uo + Sp + bpH1(mw, Pubo, Pubp).
[ ProxySignGen ]
To sign a message m, the proxy signer computes the following steps:
- Select a random r ∈ Z∗q and computes R = rP .
- Compute a = h(m,R, Pubp) and ψp = bpP .
- Compute V = (r + a)−1Vp.
The proxy signature on m is the tuple (mw, m,R, V, ψo, ψp, Pubo, Pubp).
[ ProxySignVerify ]
The proxy signature (mw, m,R, V, ψo, ψp, Pubo, Pubp) is valid if and only if
eˆ(R + h(m,R, Pubp)P, V )
= eˆ(ψo + ψp, H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))eˆ(Pubo, Rego)eˆ(Pubp, Regp).
4 Analysis of the Scheme
4.1 Correctness of proxy signature verification
eˆ(R + h(m,R, Pubp)P, V )
= eˆ((r + h(m,R, Pubp))P, (r + a)
−1Vp)
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= eˆ((r + a)P, (r + a)−1Vp)
= eˆ(P, Uo + Sp + bpH1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))
= eˆ(P, Sp + So + (bp + bo)H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))
= eˆ(P, Sp)eˆ(P, So)eˆ(P, (bp + bo)H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))
= eˆ(Pubo, Rego)eˆ(Pubp, Regp)eˆ((bo + bp)P,H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))
= eˆ(Pubo, Rego)eˆ(Pubp, Regp)eˆ(ψo + ψp, H1(mw, Pubo, Pubp))
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme satisfies the security properties
of a proxy signature, mentioned in Section 1. In addition, the scheme withstands
some other possible threats.
The scheme can withstand the strong unforgeability security property.
To create a valid proxy signature, one should need the original signer and proxy
signer private keys. Though the adversary can intercept signer partial private key
Di ( i.e., saibiPubi), he cannot construct the private key Si (i.e., sbiPubi) without
the knowledge of ai, because it is a WDHP (definition 5) which is assumed to be
a hard problem. As our scheme is proxy protected, i.e., the proxy signer has to
use his private key and original signer’s delegation power to sign a message, thus,
the original signer is also prohibited from forging a valid proxy signature. More-
over, the PKG cannot frame the signers’ with the knowledge of binding parameters
(Xi, Yi, Zi,Wi), as extracting the binding factors ai, bi from the binding parameters
is as hard as CDHP (definition 3).
The scheme can resist the identifiability, undeniability and distinguishability secu-
rity properties.
A valid proxy signature of a message m is the tuple (mw, m,R, V , ψo, ψp, Pubo,
Pubp). The public keys Pubo, Pubp and warrant mw are the straightforward wit-
nesses (i.e., identities) of the signers. In addition, a verifier will come to know the
agreement between original and proxy signers from mw.
From the correctness of the proxy signature, given in Section 4.1, it is clear that the
proxy signer cannot deny his signature creation. The verification of a valid proxy
signature needs the proxy signer’s public key, in turn, proves that the signature was
created by the proxy signer. Further, the PKG can also prove the identity of the
proxy signer, as the tuple (Regp, IDp) in the PKG public directory is a supporting
identification of a proxy signer and is also required in the proxy signature verifi-
cation phase. Any verifier will receive the proxy signature that contains warrant
mw and the public key of signers, by which the verifier can easily distinguish the
proxy signature from the normal signature.
The scheme is secure against misuse of the proxy delegation.
In the Proxy key generation phase, the original signer signs the tuple (mw, Pubo,
Pubp) and gives it to the proxy signer as his delegation capability. The proxy signer
signs a message with the proxy key that is being created by his private key and
original signer’s delegation capability. The qualification of message and limitation
of proxy is clearly defined in mw and the delegation is made for the designated
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proxy signer only. If the proxy signer misused the delegation capability, the proxy
signer will be detected by any verifier from mw. The original signer’s misuse is
also prevented because he cannot create a valid proxy signature against the name
of the proxy signer.
Apart from the above security properties, the scheme withstands the following pos-
sible threats.
Threat 1. Registration-token replacement : The PKG creates registration-token
corresponding to each registered signer and publishes it along with signer-ID in a
public directory, which is controlled by PKG only. If a request comes from signer
identity ID∗ for issuance of a partial private key, the PKG first checks whether
ID∗ is in the public directory. If it is found in the public directory, the PKG
rejects the request, otherwise executes the KeyGen algorithm for ID∗. Thus, the
registration-token replacement is not possible by any party (the PKG itself can
replace the registration-token, but we assume that the signer trusts PKG for not
to do it).
Threat 2. Man-in-the-middle attacks : In our scheme, the communication channel
of the key issuance stage is a public channel, thus an attacker may try to calculate
the private key or binding factors of a signer by intercepting the binding parame-
ters and partial private key. On intercepting the binding parameters, the adversary
can formulate the following problem : Given params, binding parameters (aiPubi,
aibiPubi, biP , aibiP , IDi) and partial private key Di (i.e., saibiPubi); Compute
private key Si (i.e. sbiPubi) or binding factors (ai, bi). To solve this problem, one
has to solve either the CDHP or the WDHP, which is assumed to be computation-
ally hard.
Threat 3. ONE partial private key → MANY private keys : The scenario of gener-
ating more than one private key from a partial private key is nor possible, because
the private key Si (i.e. sbiPubi) and the registration-token Regi are linked by the
secret binding factor bi. If a signer generates another private S
∗
i from Si and signs
a message by S∗i , then the verification of the signature fails because the change
from Si to S
∗
i is not reflected in Regi. Thereby, the signer cannot perform this
type of attempt without being detected.
Theorem 1. The proxy signature scheme is said to be secure against adaptive
chosen-massage attacks under random oracle model if no polynomially bounded ad-
versary (in k) has non-negligible advantage (in k).
Proof : The proof of the theorem is ascertained by the following challenger-adversary
game.
Setup: A challenger C takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup phase as
mentioned in Section 3. Then C returns the resulting system parameters params
to A and keeps master-key s with itself.
Queries: The adversary A issues adaptively the queries q1, q2, · · · , qm in any order
for the following:
ProxyKeyGen query on Pubj, where j = 1, · · · , m:
C runs the ProxyKeyGen phase and generates proxy key Vj using Sj and bj corre-
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sponding to Pubj, and sends it to A.
ProxySignGen query on (Pubj,M
′):
C runs the ProxyKeyGen phase and generates the proxy key Vj. Then, C signs the
message M ′ and returns the proxy signature (ω,M ′, R′, V (M ′), ψo, ψj , Pubo, Pubj)
to A.
Guess: A outputs a proxy signature for message M∗, where M∗ did not appear
in the ProxySignGen query.
Result: A wins if his produced proxy signature on M∗ is valid. The advantage of
A in attacking the scheme is defined to be the probability that A produces a valid
proxy signature in the game. We say that our scheme is secure against adaptive
chosen-message attacks under random oracle model if no polynomially bounded
adversary has non-negligible advantage in this game.
4.3 Performance
Proxy revocation : The revocation of delegation capability (i.e., proxy revoca-
tion) is an important concern in any proxy signature scheme. It is observed that
the schemes [12], [13], [14], [15] have not addressed the proxy revocation issues,
which is a practical requirement. In our scheme, proxy revocation can be easily
done by revoking the registration-token from the PKG’s public directory. If the
original signer wants to revoke his delegation of signing rights, he sends a revoke-
request tuple (Mr, mw, Rev, Pubo, Pubp, ψo) to the PKG and proxy signer, where
Rev = So + boH1(Mr, Pubo, Pubp) and Mr states the identity of the signer along
with the reason for proxy revocation. The PKG first checks the authenticity and
validity of the revoke-request and if the request is valid then PKG revokes the
tuple (Rego, IDo) and (Regp, IDp) from the public directory. We note that the
proxy signer will not object if the PKG removes (Regp, IDp) without his consent
(the original consent is with PKG), because if the delegation capability is no longer
authorized, the delegated proxy signer is no longer required. The PKG validates
the revoke-request as follows:
eˆ(Rev, P ) = eˆ(So + boH1(Mr, Pubo, Pubp), P )
= eˆ(sboPubo + boH1(Mr, Pubo, Pubp), P )
= eˆ(Rego, Pubo)eˆ(H1(Mr, Pubo, Pubp), ψo)
Key escrow : In our scheme, the PKG issues a PartialPrivateKey to the signer
and with this the signer computes his private key. The PKG is not having knowl-
edge of signer private key. To construct a private key from the partial private key,
one has to know the secret binding factor or has to solve DLP. As the binding fac-
tor is retained with the signer only, other party can not obtain signer private key
because solving DLP is a hard problem. Thus, our scheme avoid the key escrow
problem, which occurs in the schemes [12], [13], [14], [15]
No need of secure channel : To eliminate the secure channel in the key issuance
stage, we used a binding-blinding technique where the signer requests for a par-
tial private key from the PKG. We considered a simplest procedure to verify the
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genuineness of signer’s identity while partial private key issuance. After validat-
ing the signer request, the PKG issues a partial private key in a blinded manner.
Finally, the signer unblinds the partial private key to get his private key. This
binding-blinding technique avoids the secure channel in the key issuance stage.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings that provides effec-
tive proxy revocation. The scheme uses a binding-blinding technique to eliminate
the secure channel requirements in the key issuance stage. We considered a mech-
anism to avoid the unregistered identity attacks when identity is user’s email-id,
though the mechanism does not provide a generic solution for other types of iden-
tities. We leave this problem as a future scope of the proposed work. Our scheme
is not exactly ID-based scheme; however, it avoids the key escrow problem, which
remains constraint in most of the existing pairing-based proxy signature schemes.
We showed that the scheme satisfied the security requirements of a proxy signature
and also withstood other possible threats.
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